


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
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6 November 1952



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
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


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Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

State Department review  
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**F A R   E A S T**

2. Foreign Minister Okazaki lists obstacles to Japanese rearmament (page 3).

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**FAR EAST**

**2. Foreign Minister Okazaki lists obstacles to Japanese rearmament:**

While stating that the new Yoshida cabinet favors a substantial rearmament program, Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki has told

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Ambassador Murphy that several major obstacles bar early action on the question.

The chief barriers are the difficulty of amending the anti-war clause of the Constitution; the resistance anticipated from the Socialist Parties, intellectual groups, and women; and Yoshida's distrust of the old military clique.

Comment: A two-thirds Diet vote, plus a majority popular vote, is necessary to amend the Constitution. Okazaki favors an information program to enlighten the public on the need for rearmament prior to any attempt to initiate an amendment. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government, mindful of the heavy cost of rearmament, may be expected to continue its cautious approach to the question.

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